

A Geography of Basque Political Violence

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Introduction

On 3 July 1997 many Spanish newspapers were euphoric about the release of businessman Cosme Delclaux and the liberation of prison guard José Antonio Ortega Lara. Both had been kidnapped by ETA and kept hostage during a long time. One week later the young politician Miguel Angel Blanco was kidnapped by ETA and found with two bullets in the head near the village of Lasarte. July 13 1997 Blanco died from shot injury. Euphoria after liberation of ETA victims and subsequent killing seem to fit well in the vicious circle of police action and terrorist reaction, which mark the last three decades of the twentieth century in the Spanish Basque Country.

In the Spanish Basque country the origin of violent separatism has been explained from many angles. Most scholars mention the role of repression under the Franco dictatorship (1937-1975) making life impossible for Basque language and culture and impeding the organisation of labour in independent trade unions, or refer to the massive influx of Spanish speaking migrants during the industrialisation of the 1950s and 1960s having a disrupting effect on traditional rural ways of life of many autochthonous Basques (Anderson 1990, Clark 1984, Díez Medrano 1995, Loyer 1997, Römhildt 1994, Sullivan 1988, Zirekzadeh 1991). During the 1960s, separatist resistance gradually became more violent, despite repressive countermeasures of the Spanish government.

After the restoring of parliamentary democracy in 1977 ETA, which stands for Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Basque Country and Freedom) attacks continued, even after the Basque Country was granted far reaching competencies in the fields of education, culture, public order, health and socio-economic policy in 1979. Surprisingly, the new status of "Autonomous Community" for Euskadi (the Basque Country) did not result in a decrease of political violence nor in a significant decline of support for separatism. Between 1978 en 1991 ETA was responsible for 250 violent actions per year (Llera, 1994 p. 99).

The continuity of violent separatism is not only a problem because of the direct damage to persons and goods, but also for its indirect damage to Spanish democracy. This damage consists of unconstitutional counterforces from within the Spanish administration and a lack of legitimacy of the Spanish State in Euskadi. Unconstitutional counterforces have become manifest in the notorious coup attempt by Colonel Tejero in 1981 and are still bothering Spanish mainstream politics through the GAL (Grupos de Acción de Liberación) affair, counter terrorism organised from within the state apparatus during the 1980s. Both a reduced bargaining capacity of separatist Basque leadership and the massive support for violent separatism contribute to the persistency of the problem of politically inspired violence in Spain.

Not surprising is the existence of political violence as such because most countries of the Western world have experienced terrorist actions of small radical groups. Instead, it is the continuous massive support to ETA and its political wing Herri Batasuna that is surprising. So far most studies have sought to explain the Basque question along structural lines, through an actor-oriented approach, from an historical perspective, by a view based on primordialism, with the help of rational choice theory or via social psychological analysis. None of these approaches, however, offers a satisfactory explanation for the geographical concentration of support for violent separatism. Though some geographers have contributed to the understanding of Basque political radicalism (Anderson 1990, Loyer 1997, Mansvelt Beck 1991, Sullivan 1988) a rigid description and analysis of the geographical context of Basque separatism are still missing.

Violent separatism embraces various levels of involvement. The highest level concerns the direct commitment to violent actions of ETA. Evidently, kidnapers, bombers and gunmen belong to this level as do those who are actively involved in the organisation directly supporting violent actions as

is for instance the forced collecting of "revolutionary tax" from local businessmen used to finance ETA operations. Direct commitment to ETA is heavily sanctioned by Law. Therefore this highest level of directly involved activists is the most invisible one.

The intermediate level of involvement consists of persons who are trying to mark public places with the icons of radical separatism, destroying symbols of "spanishness" and "capitalism" by the burning of government buildings, party seats of rivaling political parties, banks, using graffiti, and the menacing of persons who are thought to disagree with radical separatism. The youth gangs having their impress in public space are frequently organised by Jarrai, the youth organisation of Herri Batasuna, ETA's political wing. This politically inspired mob violence and street vandalism is a phenomenon which is part of daily life in areas of the Basque country and which is forcibly reminding every citizen the persistence of radical separatism. Although this targeted hooliganism is prohibited, the participants are relatively more visible than the ETA members. Jarrai members may be recruited by ETA, while ETA members may also be active in Jarrai, which implies the existence of a transition zone between the two levels of involvement.

The latter also applies to Herri Batasuna, ETA's political wing. Popular support for separatism is geographically concentrated. This support can be traced by the electoral success of Herri Batasuna (HB), ETA's political wing. The aim of this study is to assess to what extent the geographical concentration of Basque separatism (read: HB voting) is related to isolation, migration, urbanisation, socio-economic and language characteristics.

The ideology of Herri Batasuna is a strange blend of nationalist ideas based on myths on the Basque past and neomarxist ideologies from the 1960s relating underdevelopment with colonialism and capitalism (Römhildt 1994). Since 1979 HB participates in elections and has a stable but slowly eroding electorate. The election results for the Spanish Parliament would entitle HB in 1998 to occupy two out of the 350 seats. The seats, however, remain empty because HB does not recognise the Spanish Constitution and therefore does not participate in any activities connected with the "Spanish State".

Geographically HB voters are concentrated in certain parts of Euskadi (the Autonomous Community of the Basque Country and the north-western fringe of Spanish Navarre. This study will be confined to Euskadi (Fig. 1), where 155,000 votes for HB in 1996 were counted for the elections for the Spanish Parliament, six times as much as in Navarre. Euskadi's map shows a high concentration of recent HB votes in the north, particularly in the interior of the Province of Guipúzcoa. The HB voting pattern is remarkably persistent in the north east of Euskadi as since the existence of this party it had a more continuous electoral support rather than in other parts of the Basque Country (Fig. 2). Comparing HB voting for the 1986 and 1994 Regional Parliament elections, an increasing concentration of HB voting can be observed in those municipalities where HB was already strongly represented (Table 1). The HB-dominated areas may be considered as the militant separatist part of the Basque Country. Though the remaining of Euskadi is not pro-ETA, it still has a considerable Basque nationalist electorate. In these areas Partido Nacional Vasco (Basque Nationalist Part) and, to a lesser degree Eusko Alkartasuna, a party which has splitted off from the former, dominate the political landscape. The landscape of Basque nationalist parties, however, is interrupted by a Spanish parties who have strongholds in the lower class residential districts of the Bilbao agglomeration at the left bank of the river Nervión. In this study, however, the focus will be on HB -read ETA- support.

The continuity of Herri Batasuna Voting

The main question to be answered is to what extent ETA-areas within Euskadi differ from areas

with other electoral characteristics, or - in other worlds - is there a specific environment that forms HB's biotope?

Regarding such an environment, four components will be taken into account, namely:

1. Culture
2. Socio-economic conditions
3. Scale, and
4. Isolation

Subsequently will be explained why each of these components have been selected for analysis.

Regarding **culture** it will be analysed to what extent culture in HB areas differs from culture in the other parts of the Basque Country. From the considerable body of literature available it is suggested that Basque separatism is related to a recent history of contact of native inhabitants with migrants, castilianized urbanites or repressive bureaucrats. The migrants, disparagingly labelled as **maketos**, brought natives in contact with other cultures which they considered less pure, less noble and as a consequence inferior to their own culture. Evidently, contact between cultures is most shocking in areas where the culture of native Basques differs most from non-Basque migrants. This is expected to occur particularly in immigration areas where Basque culture is confronted with Spanish culture. Therefore those parts of Euskadi having a native Castilian-speaking population culturally not so different from migrants coming from elsewhere in Spain, will be expected to have less frustration in the contact with migrants and consequently less tendency to radical separatism. The other argument to support culture as an important component of the local context is in HB's political programme, which advocates a monolingual Basque Country and not a bilingual one as the biggest nationalist party Partido Nacionalista Vasco proposes. Compared to PNV the focus on Basquisition might favour HB's attraction to Euskera speakers.

Concerning **socio-economic conditions**, the internal colonialism thesis, an urban bias approach, and other (neo)Marxist explanations for the rise of Basque radical separatism can easily be defeated for the Basque country as a whole (Anderson, 1990). This is because Basque capital has been more important in colonising Spain during the last century rather than capital from the Spanish heartland of Castile colonising Euskadi. However, within the Basque country itself market integration may have contributed to an increasing support of HB. HB combines leftist radical and separatist ideas that may have a specific attractiveness to social groups suffering from market integration. These groups may have lost confidence in mainstream politics to solve their problem. Suffering from market integration is reflected in the level of social misery which can be theoretically interpreted both in Marxist and classical terms. But, before interpreting data on separatist support and social misery there should provide empirical evidence about their relation. Therefore a higher proportion of radical separatism is expected in localities with a high and rapidly increasing level of social misery.

Social disruption, however, may also be caused by accelerated processes of economic change implying a radical shift from agrarian to non-agricultural occupations. Therefore it will also be tested if areas with a relatively few social misery but with a recent rapid shift in economic base are comparatively more dominated by radical separatism than areas not having these properties.

Geographical contexts of human interaction differ according to **scale**. Human behaviour usually is more subject to social control in smaller rather than large-size settlements. Various authors suggest that around Herri Batasuna (HB) and ETA a socially controlled subculture has developed with both sectarian and traditional Basque features. The sectarian component, often mentioned in the Spanish mainstream press, is reflected in the isolation of the political movement of HB with respect to the rest of society. HB is used to condemn not only those institutions and persons holding opposite ideas to theirs, like everything and everybody somehow related to the "Spanish State", but also the

HB sympathisers who try to improve communication with state institutions in order to obtain concessions through negotiations. Gurrutxaga Abad (1996, pp. 175-180) even makes mention of a closed territory in which ETA sympathisers exclusively communicate with fellow believers. Anthropologists as Heiberg (1989) and Zulaika (1988), and the sociologist Pérez-Agote (1986, 1987), have emphasised the role of small informal networks in keeping the collective memory of Francoist repression alive and actively supporting HB and ETA. These networks based on traditional culture are the *cuadrillas*, groups of the same age and sex who join several times per week. Bars and restaurants are thus jointly frequented. In bigger cities the *cuadrillas* usually have disappeared and are replaced by looser, more individual and formal relations. In contrast many *cuadrillas* of villages and small towns are now linked with HB or Partido Nacional Vasco. ETA, HB, and their affiliated organisations in the field of unionism, education in Basque, environment, etc. have common characteristics with the *cuadrillas* as they do not have any hierarchical organisation and share a certain disapproval of vertically organised institutions. Both HB and ETA are more a conglomerate of informal local organisations rather than modern parties with a clear distinction of responsibilities, rights and duties between the respective levels. Given these organisational and cultural characteristics it is expected that HB will be more prominent in small settlements.

Finally, apart from social control of political belief political cleansing occurs through the following mechanisms particularly in small municipalities. Though political cleansing is hardly described by social scientists, but well dealt with by the Spanish press the following three methods are used. First, in politics, the local arenas, e.g. the municipal councils, are being used to create majority and to compartmentalise the respective nationalist parties. Secondly, forced commitment to separatist aims is created through "revolutionary tax" raised by ETA, menacing people holding alternative and less radical ideas by boycotting or terror against supposed opponents. Wieviorka (1997, pp. 336-337) makes mention of employers leaving the rural areas for the towns where there families where less threatened and where they could escape from paying revolutionary tax due to a more anonymous environment. Finally, internal purification occurs through the political elimination of bridge builders (killing, expulsion, isolation of dissidents). Evidently, social control in smaller settlements is stronger and may enable political cleansing.

How geographical **isolation** will influence HB support is highly questionable. On the one hand emphasis on closed cultures and reduced communication space would assume isolation to play a significant role in the continuity of ETA's legitimacy. On the other the collective memory of repression by the "Spanish" is still a strongly represented in the ETA-HB discourse. But where could we expect most frustrations and concomitant radical separatist voting caused by a recent past of repressive contact? Is it in those places where there has been much contact probability with a repressive administration, or is it in those areas having few contact but much concern about potential contact? The first assumption supposes frequent frustrating contact and the second one defensive isolation.

The analysis of cultural, socio-economic, scale and isolation factors will be based on municipal data of regional elections of 1994, spoken language, employment and unemployment, population size and communication. Regional elections have been taken because they result in real political representation in contrast to elections for the Spanish Parliament, whereas in municipal elections many local parties participate that may be closely linked to ETA-HB, but operate under other names. There are now 249 municipalities in Euskadi, whereas they totalled 236 in the early 1980s.

Basque culture under pressure

Most inhabitants of the Basque Country identify themselves rather as Basques than Spaniards. Even migrants and particularly their off-spring, who settled during the 1950s and 1960s in the rapidly industrialising Euskadi region often see themselves as Basques. Many Basques share their affiliation for typical aspects of culture such as gastronomic habits, interest for certain sports (pelota vasca, stone lifting, traditional rowing races, cycling, football), religiosity, or love for nature. Although some these cultural traits have been weakened by external factors or changing value systems, the key characteristic of Basque culture which has most suffered from change in modern history has been language. The Basque language, Euskera, has been declining since centuries. Spanish governments, education in castilian, military service, migration of many castilian speaking to the industrialising areas of the Basque Country, the lack of “high culture in Euskera (as revealed by the scarcity of written sources) and a dialectological diversity have increasingly menaced the position of this language. Spanish has become the language of the cities, the administration, and the learned, while Basque survived as the vernacular language of the peasants living in the *baserriak*, the farmsteads scattered in the countryside (Mansvelt Beck 1994). Despite the increased command of Euskera due to the language policies of the Basque Autonomous Government, the use of the language in the private sphere has rather decreased instead of increased.

Politically a Basque identification is expressed in the nationalist voting behaviour with the Partido Nacional Vasco (PNV) as the most voted party. PNV is voted by both Basque and Spanish speakers. In contrast, support for Herri Batasuna is mainly concentrated in the areas where Euskera is still important as a home language (Fig. 3). Statistically the proportion of those who speak Basque at home per municipality has the strongest correlation out of all variables with voting for HB, here seen as the percentage of valid HB votes on the total valid votes during regional elections of 1994). The correlation between Basque speaking and HB voting is 0,72, which is in line with the correlations for elections for the Spanish and European parliaments. Only municipal elections (1995) show lower correlations due to the participation of local parties or the absence of local HB divisions.

Although the general impression of a coincidence of Basque speaking and HB support is correct, there is a remarkably high support for HB in municipalities with a mixed population of Euskera speaking autochthonous and migrants. This because HB voting is higher than might have been expected given the proportion of Basque speaking as is illustrated by HB voting percentages in ethnically mixed municipalities of 50 to 80 percent Basque speaking, that are as high as in the pure Basque speaking municipalities (30% versus 35% (Table 2). On the other hand. A surprisingly high support for HB can be observed in several predominantly Spanish-speaking municipalities. These municipalities are situated in areas that are castilianised since centuries as in the province of Alava and the district of Encartaciones, west of Bilbao, or that have been recently industrialised and have large migrant populations.

HB support: social misery or social disruption?

Since the end of the nineteenth century Euskadi is one of Spain’s most industrialised regions. Heavy industry based on coal and steel, such as ship-building, large-scale chemical industry, machine manufacturing and so on have been characteristic for the Basque economy. Specialisation on Fordist activities facilitated by decades of Spanish protection by tariff and trade walls for manufactured products turned to be disadvantageous after the oil crisis of the seventies and the gradual integration of Spain into the global economy. The loss of protection made many Basque industries now subject to international competition, leading to the closing-down of many factories

in a region that before hardly suffered from unemployment. Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa, the most industrialised provinces converted from an economic core area to one of Spain's problem regions. During the nineties unemployment oscillates around 22 percent, which is about the Spanish average. Vizcaya, the most industrialised province and the province most specialised in heavy industries, is most affected by the industrial decline of all Basque provinces with 25 percent of jobless.

Unemployment as a form of social misery may be a breeding ground for a *radical nationalist and social movement* as ETA-Herri Batasuna. This because the movement attempts to politically exploit social discontent by mobilising an impoverishing proletariat. Though initially the social basis of ETA was situated in the biggest industrial area, the agglomeration of Bilbao, several studies mention a gradual shift of ETA support after 1970 to smaller towns and rural areas of the mountains of the north east of Euskadi (Clark 1984, p. 60; Sullivan 1988, p. 134).

However, the socio-economic conditions in areas with much ETA-HB tend to refute any social-misery hypothesis because unemployment does not correlate with HB voting. In contrast, the correlation is even slightly negative. Only in the municipalities where HB is weakly represented as in Castilian-speaking Alava, there is a slightly positive correlation with unemployment (coefficient of 0.45 in municipalities of less than 20 percent Basque speakers (Table 3). Voting for HB in Spanish-speaking areas, may therefore be interpreted as a protest vote against social misery. This interpretation is supported by a no-participation of HB in municipal elections (1995) in one third of the municipalities of Spanish-speaking Euskadi, here seen as the municipalities of less than 10% Basque speakers. In these municipalities HB probably suffered too much aversion to enable the establishment of a local Party office.

If social misery is not a factor in HB voting, is it perhaps social disruption as a consequence of accelerated and deep economic change that fosters radical nationalism?

In his study about Itziar, a village on the coast of the province of Guipúzcoa, Zulaika (1988) describes the rise of ETA. One of the factors that influenced people in their political choice in Itziar, and elsewhere in Euskadi, was the disappearance of the old way of subsistence and the shift to a new one. Traditionally subsistence was based on agriculture and, on the coast on fishing.

Agriculture, however, has practically disappeared as less than three percent of the occupied population in the two coastal provinces of Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa still works in farming. Using Itziar as an example deruralisation of Euskadi is illustrated by the abandoning of many farmsteads, totalling one third of them in 1980. Many farmers are nowadays working in nearby factories and left their *baserriak* for a house in the nuclear village. According to Zulaika (1998, p 118) particularly persons who abandoned their old farming life style shifted to work in manufacturing industry, and having an educational level above average (amongst them many ex-seminarists) felt themselves attracted to ETA.

There are indications in favour and against the correctness of Zulaika's suggestions. In favour is the spatial voting pattern in which HB concentration is analogue to Euskadi's settlement pattern of *baserriak*, which prevails in the provinces of Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa. The only area where this pattern does not correspond with voting behaviour is the district of Encartaciones, which has always been Castilian speaking. Unfortunately, the occupational change per municipality can hardly explain HB voting in itself, since a rural exodus has been taking place anywhere in the Basque countryside. Even the existence of HB strongholds in Guipúzcoa may contradict the hypothesis of social disruption through radical and accelerated change of economic structure because the industrialisation process and structure differ from Vizcaya (Castells 1989: 757). Industrialisation was a more gradual process than in Vizcaya and people therefore had more time to adapt themselves which could potentially mitigate social disruption. Moreover, manufacturing activities

have been more diversified and scattered than in Vizcaya with its large-scale industrial monoculture and would require less migration to the cities and less adjustment to a Fordist environment. Consequently, social disruption by changing economic structures may particularly be expected in Vizcaya and not in Guipúzcoa with its strong HB representation. If it is not rapid industrialisation explaining HB affiliation, is it perhaps rurality? This idea can also be rejected because rurality measured in terms of the percentage of employed in agriculture, and HB do not show significant correlations (coefficients of -0.18 en -0.14 for municipalities of respectively over 50% en 80% Basque speaking, Table 3).

Scale: a factor in the reproduction of the legitimacy of violence

Innocent travellers might have the impression of a strong ETA support in the big cities of Euskadi. There they can observe graffiti, manifestations, watch burned cashing machines and occasionally see bands of youngsters rioting in the city centres. Evidently, ETA has its support and its sympathising organisations represented in any big city of the Basque Country. Egin, the newspaper has been sold up to 15 July 1998 when it was banned by the Spanish police force, in Bilbao, Vitoria and San Sebastián, the latter city being the location of Egin's headquarters. LAB, the trade-union affiliated to ETA, AEK, the basquisition organisation for adults sympathising with ETA and HB, they are all represented in the bigger cities. AEK, compared to anti-militarist, feminist and ecologist movements is the social movement most closely linked to ETA and HB (Tejerina et al 1995, pp. 115-117). Sometimes they are so influential that the Basque public administration has to deal with them. For instance about 80 percent of the Euskal Telebista of San Sebastián, the Basque TV. station, are members of LAB with whom the management has to negotiate. AEK has to be subcontracted by HARE, the official Basque-Government organisation for adult language instruction of Euskera, because otherwise no courses of Euskera could not be organised. However, despite their obvious presence in the cities, these organisations have never been able to take total possession of the streets. Therefore in the cities one can also see anti-ETA organisations manifesting themselves as in the case of silent people grouped together with burning torches wearing blue bow ties as a symbol of pacifism. In the plural environment of the cities it is particularly the institutions linked to ETA and HB who contribute to the continuing legitimacy of political violence. From this urban environment an increasing share of Eitarras caught by the policy is originating, amongst them more and more youngsters of non-native Basque or of mixed origin. The growing importance of the cities as a breeding ground and a recruitment area of ETA militants is, however, in strong contrast with the changing geographical concentration of HB voting. Concentration of HB according to the scale of settlements is carried out by taking the population size of municipalities as the scale indicator (Table 4). In two ways the use of population size may bias the outcome of the measurement. First, in urban agglomerations like greater Bilbao the population is distributed over thirty municipalities while San Sebastián and Vitoria also have adjacent municipalities which form an integrated part of the urban area. However, many of these suburbs have a population size which let them easily be recognised as urban areas having a significant demographic weight. Secondly, municipalities in the countryside may be one or several nuclear villages, or scattered farmsteads. Many isolated farms, however, have been left so that nowadays the population in the smaller municipalities is more concentrated in the central towns and villages and in the *baserriak* well connected to the road network. The small town and the village of the Basque-speaking areas of Guipúzcoa and Vizcaya seem to be the place where the ideology of radical nationalism is reproduced. The stronger HB is represented, the smaller the municipality is (Table 4). Even in Spanish Navarre the Euskera-speaking settlement,

which is more rural according to their populations reveal a strong concentration of HB support. Obviously it is the social control of small-scale settlements in the Basque cultural area that helps to reproduce the legitimisation of political violence. Paradoxically the Spanish elements in Basque culture are crucial to this reproduction. The group behaviour in *cuadrillas* is similar, if not, identical to group behaviour elsewhere in Spain where the *cuadrilla* bears the name of *pandilla*. The *poteo* and the *pinchos*, jealously presented by many Basques of Euskadi as typically Basque have their Spanish equivalents in the *paseo* and the *tapas*. Even in Spanish politics the local party offices resemble the ones of the Basque nationalist parties as they combine their office function with a role as an informal meeting place, where you can have a drink, a chat, and practice folklore dances and singing. Contrarily, in the French Basque country there is no such group behaviour, nor similar institutions in which ideologies are reproduced. Thus, if Basque culture helps to reproduce an ideology legitimising political violence, it is not Basque culture in general, but it is Spanish Basque culture.

Isolation

The motorway from San Sebastián to Vitoria crosses the district of Goierri, known as a stronghold of HB. Perhaps it is on this motorway that the busiest traffic of the whole Basque Country can be observed. Busy traffic suggests openness instead of isolation. By a connectivity analysis based on GIS techniques using GRADAP earlier applied in the case of Catalonia (Wessels & Mansvelt Beck 1993), it is shown that high connectivity scores occur in the north east of Euskadi and around Bilbao, whereas the lowest scores can be found in the countryside of the south. BETA scores in multiple regression between connectivity and HB voting are not significant (Table 5). Similar results are revealed by analysing the statistical relationship between the number telephone connections per 1000 inhabitants and HB voting. Thus both isolation and communication as factors for violence legitimisation at the municipal level can be refuted.

Conclusion

Despite the transfer of competencies of the central Spanish Administration to the Autonomous Community of the Basque Country in all field of politics and policies since 1979, decentralisation did not refrain ETA from the use of violence. Here it has been demonstrated that ETA disposes of a firm social basis composed by voters for Herri Batasuna, its political wing. Though support for this party is slowly eroding, it still has considerable support. HB remains politically, socially but not geographically isolated from circles holding alternative ideas. The strongholds from where ETA's violence is supported are the Basque-speaking settlements. Contact of Euskera speakers with migrants from other parts of Spain has possibly increased ethnic consciousness, which is reflected by the comparatively high percentages of electoral participation of HB-voting municipalities. The legitimisation of violence is highest in the small and medium-sized settlements of Euskadi, which offer a context of social control wherein a socially and politically closed interaction system can flourish. The existence of a Basque culture in linguistic terms, however, should not simply be seen as a determinant of the legitimacy of violence. Paradoxically the integration of Spanish elements of culture in the Basque culture facilitate social control, which is crucial to the persistence of communities of believers in an ideology which still perceives the Spanish State as repressive and alien to Basqueness.

Municipalities having high rates of support for terrorism are not the most isolated ones, nor the

rural ones. Any hypothesis explaining the legitimacy of political violence by emphasising geographical isolation or rurality should therefore be rejected. Instead, there is sufficient indication that contact with migrants from other parts of Spain and contact with the outside world through transport and telecommunication may contribute to the development of ethnic and political consciousness. Comparing rural Navarre, gently industrialising Guipúzcoa and abruptly industrialising Vizcaya, there are hardly significant differences in HB support per municipality. Thus Zulaika's thesis developed on his case study of Itziar seeing the shift from peasant way of life to a modern-industrial life as disrupting existing social networks and institutions and undermining the belief in traditional ideologies, which are replaced by alternative networks, institutions and ideologies of a radical nationalist brand is not supported by the statistical data of Basque municipalities. This is because radicalist ideologies and concomitant organisations and institutions have spread all over the Basque-speaking settlements of Spain. The diffusion is nowadays frozen in a firm social basis that is geographically concentrated. As long as this social basis who legitimises political violence continues to exist in the Basque Country, a solution of the political conflict is unthinkable. The social basis fosters the continuity of violence and impedes further compromise with the Spanish central authority. Violence is continuously nourished within the closed communication system in which ETA has its martyrs and heroes and in which the collective memory of the worst period of Francoist repression is kept alive. Whoever in Euskadi talks with ETA sympathisers may get the impression that repression is still as harsh as during the worst period of Franco's dictatorship...

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Table 1. Valid Votes for Herri Batasuna per Municipality, Regional Parliament 1994, 1986*

HB % Valid Votes 1994	HB % Votes 1994 - 19986 (Median)	HB % Votes 1994 - 19986 Min.- Max.	N
ò50	+11.7	+2.5 to +25.9	12
ò40 - <50	+8.2	-5.7 to +18.8	19
ò30- <40	+4.3	-8.4 to +35.8	31
ò20- <30	+1.8	-8.2 to +7.1	62
ò10 -<20	-1.0	-9.1 to + 10.1	71
0 - <10	-2.4	-7.0 to + 4.3	41
Total	+0.7	-9.1 to +35.8	236

*The 149 municipalities of 1996 have been aggregated into the 236 municipalities of 1986 (see Appendix 1)

Table 2. Basque speakers, HB voting* and migration per municipality, Euskadi (N= 247)

% Basque speaking	Median Basque speaking	HB voting median %	Median % migrants	Number of municipalities
0-<10	0.3%	11%	25%	89
10-<50	32%	22%	26%	57
50-<80	66%	31%	10%	46
80-100	92%	35%	3%	55

*Elections Regional Parliament 1994, % valid votes

Sources: EUSTAT 1994, 1996

Table 3. Basque speakers, HB voting* and unemployment per municipality, Euskadi (N= 247)

% Basque speaking	Correlation coefficient % unemployed (1991) and HB voting %
0-<10	0.45
<50	0.29
>50	0.18
>80	0.14
Total	0.11

*Elections Regional Parliament 1994, % valid votes

Sources: EUSTAT 1994, 1996

Table 4. HB voting* and Municipal Size (number of inhabitants)

% HB	Mean	Median	Minimum	Maximum	n
ò25%	3206	1007	78	41646	94
ò30%	2060	687	78	18489	68
ò40%	1030	531	78	8413	36
ò50%	475	370	78	1582	13

*Elections Regional Parliament 1994, % valid votes

Sources: EUSTAT 1994, 1996

Table 5 Multiple regression % HB voting 1994 (dependent variable), BETA scores, municipalities

Independent variables	Standardised Coefficient BETA
% Basque speaking	0.67
Number of telephones per 1000 inhabitants	-0.02
Connectivity (Hubbel Index)	0.03
Log number of inhabitants	-0.92
% Unemployed	0.92
% Occupations in Agriculture	-1.64
% Migrants	-0.10

Appendix 1. Desannexed Municipalities between 1986-1994

Current name	Aggregated old entity
Zierbana	Abanto y Zierbana
Nabarniz	Gernika-Lumo
Murueta	Gernika -Lumo
Forua	Gernika-Lumo
Kortezubi	Gernika-Lumo
Ajangiz	Gernika-Lumo
Arratzu	Gernika-Lumo
Alonsotegi	Barakaldo
Astigarraga	Donostia (San Sebastián)
Altzaga	Itsasondo
Izkaztegieta	Iuerrieta
Baliarrain	Iuerrieta
Orendain	Iuerrieta

Source: EUSTAT 1989